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Enforcing the Bargain v. Materiality 
Requirement 
The Future of Disclosure-Only Settlements 
Post-Trulia 
 




In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery broke away from its tradition of routinely 
approving disclosure-only settlements and required disclosures 
to be material in order to cure the conflict of interest between 
plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class.  I argue that fairness 
of settlement is the only standard in approving class action 
settlements and fairness will not be achieved by requiring 
materiality.  Shareholders are legally entitled to all material 
information, as the board’s fiduciary duty dictates.  Thus, 
material disclosures are enforcement of a legal duty that is no 
consideration for the release of shareholder claims.  On the 
other hand, fairness could be achieved by enforcing the bargain 
if the bargaining process was conducted fairly and in good 
faith.  The agency problem and the conflict of interest between 
the plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class can be resolved by 
judicial assessment on whether there was adequate 
representation based on the effort of the plaintiff’s counsel and 
the appropriate attorney fee award according to the well-
established three-scale system in quantifying the appropriate 
attorney fees.  In addition, overbroad releases can be rescinded 
under the contract doctrines of fraud and unconscionability if 
such settlements were fraudulently induced or the release is 
overbroad compared to the benefit that the disclosures conveyed. 
 
* Copyright © 2018 by Hao Jiang. Visiting Assistant Professor, Tulane Law 
School.  Visiting Fellow at Max Planck Institute for Comparative and 
International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany. J.D., S.J.D.,Tulane Law 
School. I would like to thank Jim Gordley, Onnig Dombalagian, Ann Lipton 
and participants of Tulane Law School Faculty Workshop and UCLA 
Corporate and Securities Litigation Workshop. I am also grateful for the 
research support that I received at Max Planck Institute.   
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I. Introduction 
 
A settlement agreement is a contract, and its terms are 
usually enforced by courts as such.  In contract law, normative 
doctrines and theories are not concerned about the fairness of 
the terms so long as they were freely negotiated in the 
marketplace.  Delaware courts, as the de facto national 
business lawmaker, have an even stronger desire to respect 
freedom of contract and favor the terms in the voluntary 
settlement.1 
In approving class action settlements in Delaware, just as 
in other states, the law is more paternalistic to protect the 
weaker party, the plaintiff class.  The court has to assume the 
fiduciary duty to independently examine the fairness of the 
class action settlement before approving it.2  Such an approval 
“‘requires more than a cursory scrutiny by the court of the 
issues presented.’  The [c]ourt must exercise its own judgment 
to determine whether the settlement is reasonable and 
intrinsically fair.”3  In determining the fairness of the 
settlement, the court also has to evaluate “‘the reasonableness 
of the “give” and the “get,”‘ or what the class members receive 
in exchange for ending the litigation.”4  Supposedly, when it is 
clear that there is gross disparity between the two sides of the 
proposed class action settlement, it is the Court’s statutory 
duty to disapprove it. 
A disclosure-only settlement is a non-monetary form of 
settlement where the plaintiffs, a class of stockholders, release 
any breach of fiduciary duty claims they may have against a 
company in connection to the sale of a company.  In return, 
they receive supplemental disclosures.  Meanwhile, the only 
money changing hands would be the plaintiff’s attorney fees, 
which are paid by the corporations under the corporate benefit 
 
1.  Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49, 53 (Del. 1964) (Explaining Delaware 
has long favored the voluntary settlement over litigation). 
2.  Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 58-59 (Del. 1991).  See also DEL. CH. 
CT. R. 23. 
3.  In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891 (Del. Ch. 
2016).  See also DEL. CH. CT. R. 23. 
4.  In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891. 
3
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doctrine.5  Such settlements are often described as “a 
peppercorn and a fee[,]”6 a peppercorn for the plaintiff class 
and a sizeable fee for the plaintiff’s counsel.  Supposedly, so 
long as the settlement is not one sided, the Court has no reason 
to disapprove the settlement.  The Court’s fiduciary duty is to 
ensure the fairness of the bargain in the class action settlement 
rather than to police the minimum price.  Therefore, if 
information is the only consideration, the release of meritorious 
claims deserves meaningful disclosure, or even material 
disclosure.  The broad release of meritorious claims deserves 
material information, or information that has value that equals 
the release of the claims.  On the other hand, it should not 
offend a court that non-meritorious claims were released for 
disclosures that have basically no value or only therapeutic 
value. 
Traditionally, the Delaware Court of Chancery routinely 
approved such settlements as they were proposed.  In recent 
years, virtually all major merger transactions in Delaware 
have resulted in shareholder litigation.  The percentage of 
shareholder litigation arising out of transactions of $100 
million or more increased from 39.3% in 2005 to 94.9% in 
2014.7  Such litigation would be filed right after the 
announcement of a proposed transaction and its existence 
would pose a threat to the closing of such transaction.  Half of 
such transactions result in disclosure-only settlements.  Given 
the proliferation of litigation, the Chancery Court is now 
concerned that approving disclosure-only settlements and 
awarding fees as proposed will result in court-approved, 
overbroad release of liabilities for the contracting parties, 
directors, officers, and advisors for disclosures that did not 
convey any benefits to the plaintiff class.  This is due to the 
agency problem between the plaintiff’s counsels and the 
 
5.  When a plaintiff pursues a cause of action relating to the internal 
affairs of a Delaware corporation and generates benefits for the corporation 
or its stockholders, Delaware law calls for the plaintiff to receive an award of 
attorneys’ fees and expenses determined based on the factors set forth in 
Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980). 
6.  This term was coined by former Chancellor Allen.  Solomon v. Pathe 
Commc’ns Corp., CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 
1995). 
7.  In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 894. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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plaintiff class. 
The Chancery Court has grown wary of the divergent or 
conflicted incentives plaintiff firms might have in reaching a 
disclosure-only settlement.  Once they reach a disclosure-only 
settlement, they would normally be awarded a six-figure 
attorney’s fee.  If the market were perfect, and plaintiff firm’s 
incentive was compatible with the plaintiff, the court would not 
have to worry about the fairness of the settlement as a 
contract.  If it were a monetary settlement, the Court would 
pay less attention to the adequacy of the consideration and 
simply give deference to the settlement terms.8  When there is 
no monetary award to the shareholders, the Court is troubled 
by the plaintiff counsel’s divergent incentive to quickly deliver 
a settlement that does not confer any benefits to the plaintiff 
class. 
In the notable recent case, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder 
Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery broke away from 
the tradition of approving non-monetary disclosure-only 
settlements and made it clear that such disclosure settlements 
“[will] be met with continued disfavor” unless supplemental 
disclosures are “plainly material” and the scope of release is 
proportionate to the claims.9  Materiality turns on whether 
“there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider [the disclosure] important in deciding how to 
vote.”10  “It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood 
that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the 
reasonable investor to change his vote.”11  But the disclosure of 
omitted facts “would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
 
8.  See In re Cox Radio Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No. 4461-VCP, 
2010 WL 1806616, at *1, (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010) (only a one dollar increase in 
the tender offer price resulted from the settlement, but the Court approved 
the settlement despite objector’s claim that it was only a modest benefit). 
9 In re Trulia,129 A.3d at 898 (“To be more specific, practitioners should 
expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued 
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly 
material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the 
proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing more than 
disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if the 
record shows that such claims have been investigated sufficiently.”). 
10.  Tsc Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
11.  Id. 
5
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information made available.”12 
The triggering event of this policy change was the patently 
inadequate representation the Court found in In re Rural 
Metro Corp. Shareholders Litigation.  In that case, the board of 
directors were found liable for breach of fiduciary duty and the 
bankers were found to have aided and abetted the breaches in 
the sale of corporation.13  The original plaintiff firm sought to 
secure a $475,000 attorney fee award by accepting 
supplemental disclosure after a low-cost investigation, which 
only incurred less than $15,000 in out-of-pocket expenses, 
including expert fees.14  Things got turned around when the 
objector surfaced and the replacement counsels took over and 
investigated the facts vigorously.  The new counsels incurred 
over $1.1 million in expert expenses and 6953 hours of attorney 
time.15  As a result, a partial settlement was reached at $11.6 
million.16  An attorney fee award of $2.9 million was awarded 
based on the benefit of $11.6 million in “cold hard cash.”17 
A lot has been written on how to resolve the agency 
problem.18  In In re Trulia, the court adopted the materiality 
 
12.  Id.  See also Unanue v. Unanue, No. Civ. A. 204-N, 2004 WL 
2521292, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004). 
13.  See generally In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 
(Del. Ch. 2014). 
14.  Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic 
Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 907 (2016) 
[hereinafter Rural/Metro].  
15.  Id. at 908. 
16.  Id.  
17.  Id. at 892 (quoting Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 27-28, In re 
Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 2013 WL 7137206 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 
2013) (No. 6350-VCL)). 
18.  See, e.g., Rural/Metro, supra note 14; Sean J. Griffith, Correcting 
Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine 
on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Correcting Corporate Benefit]; 
Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can 
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE 
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. 
Thomas eds., forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Private Ordering Post-Trulia], 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2855950; Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, 
Of Babies and Bathwater: Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits without 
Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 
(2016); Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware 
Court of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only 
Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669 (2013). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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requirement proposed by one article.19  In Of Babies and 
Bathwater, the authors provide a two-part test that aims to 
“eliminate the weakest two-thirds of all stockholder 
litigation.”20  The first test is that the disclosure must be 
material, without which there cannot be consideration to 
support a disclosure-only settlement.21  The second part, is that 
the Court shall not approve an overbroad release.22  The 
release shall instead be limited to the benefit of the disclosures 
obtained.23  The first part was adopted by Trulia; the second 
part has also been part of the Court’s practice24 and set out to 
protect meritorious claims that were not “properly vetted” from 
being released.25  This test “would require a demonstration that 
the proposed release is directly related to the claims pursued in 
the litigation and proportionate to the supplemental 
disclosures . . . .”26 
After Trulia, practitioners and commentators predicted 
that disclosure-based agreements, “if not entirely dead . . . are 
on life support with only the faintest hint of a pulse.”27  Sean 
Griffith, an academic who has been following the development 
of disclosure-only settlements, concluded that the heightened 
standard of materiality is now a “condition for the approval of 
disclosure settlements” in Delaware.28  Seemingly, the Court 
put its foot down and established a new rule in approving 
disclosure-only settlements.  Now, it is required that 
disclosures be material. 
In this article, I would like to examine whether the new 
materiality requirement in approving disclosure-only 
settlements is doctrinally coherent with contract law doctrines, 
 
19.  See generally Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18. 
20.  Id. at 492. 
21.  Id. at 491-92, 498. 
22.  Id. at 492. 
23.  Id. 
24.  See Transcript of Settlement Hearing and the Court’s Ruling, In re 
Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 1614336 (Del. Ch. 2014) (No. 
7857-CS). 
25.  Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18, at 492.  
26.  Id. at 538. 
27.  Eric Waxman, Disclosure-Based Settlements, Not Business as Usual, 
WALL STREET LAW., Mar. 2016, at 1. 
28.  Private Ordering Post-Trulia, supra note 18 at 5. 
7
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operates to resolve the agency problem, and ensures fairness in 
class action settlements.  I will argue that enforcing the 
bargain as agreed to is a better approach, and that the 
requirement of materiality would be contradictory to the 
doctrine of consideration by giving the board of directors policy 
incentives to withhold material information, instead of 
disclosing it in the first place.  Market competition among 
plaintiff firms and judicial assessment of appropriate attorney 
fee awards can realign the interest between the plaintiff’s 
counsel and the plaintiff class.  Lastly, the concern about the 
overbroad release of liabilities by approving disclosure-only 
settlements can be resolved by challenging the finality of the 
settlement.  I will discuss how such settlements can be 
rescinded by contract law doctrines of fraudulent 
misrepresentation and unconscionability.  In the end, I will 
conclude that enforcing the bargain is a better approach than 
the judicial mandate of materiality in approving disclosure-
only settlements and should be the future. 
 
II. Doctrinal and Policy Defects in Requiring Materiality 
 
 A. Performance of Legal Duty is No Consideration 
 
As we have discussed, the threshold in approving 
disclosure-only settlements has become that the supplemental 
disclosures must “address a plainly material misrepresentation 
or omission.”29  In Of Babies and Bathwater, the influential 
article that promoted the heightened standard, the authors 
reasoned that, in disclosure-only settlements, “[a] disclosure 
that is not material as a matter of law is not consideration as a 
matter of fact. Without consideration, there should be no 
settlement.”30  However, such an argument would open itself 
up to two doctrinal objections. 
First of all, as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts put 
it, performance of legal duty is no consideration.31  Meanwhile, 
 
29.  In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 
2016). 
30.  Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18, at 498. 
31.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1981). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to disclose all 
material information fully and fairly even when there is no 
initial duty to disclose the information.32  The fiduciary duty is 
a statutory duty under Delaware General Corporate Law, and 
logically disclosing supplemental information that is material 
is only a fulfillment of such duty and will not constitute legally 
sufficient consideration.33 
The rationale is simple: If the legal duty is already owed to 
the promisee, then the promisor did not give up any legal right 
by performing such duty.  Therefore, the performance was not 
bargained for.  Such an exchange raises a suspicion as to 
whether it is a genuine exchange.  As the comments of the 
Restatement point out, “[a] claim that the performance of a 
legal duty furnished consideration for a promise often raises a 
suspicion that the transaction was gratuitous or mistaken or 
unconscionable.”34 
Material supplemental disclosures as consideration is a 
bargain for forbearance to commit a tort, breach of fiduciary 
duty.  Such forbearance is not consideration and the promise 
may be unenforceable as against public policy.35  That is, the 
promise of a broad release of managerial liabilities out of the 
sale process would be unenforceable when it was supported by 
merely material disclosures, which is not legally sound 
consideration. 
As we discussed, Rule 23 imposes on the Court the 
fiduciary duty to examine the fairness of the class action 
settlement.36  Fairness is not preserved when material 
disclosures are given in exchange for a release because the 
plaintiff class is legally entitled to such disclosures.  Fairness is 
also not preserved when valuable, but non-material 
disclosures, that the defendant did not have pre-existing legal 
duty to provide, were given in exchange for weak claims that 
had no value. 
 
32.  Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. 
Ch. 1987).  Moreover, duties of fiduciaries are within the scope of 
Restatement § 73.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. b.  
33.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (1991). 
34.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a. 
35.  Id. § 73 cmt. b.  
36.  DEL. CH. CT. R. 23. 
9
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On the other hand, consideration need not be adequate.37  
Any performance which is bargained for is consideration.38  
This rule does not require that “consideration have an 
economic value equivalent to that of the promise.”39  It does not 
matter whether supplemental disclosures are meaningful, only 
of marginal and therapeutic value, or are simply helpful, any 
value conveyed through disclosures would be legally sufficient 
to constitute consideration.  However, this does not mean 
fairness will not be achieved without having an adequacy 
requirement in the doctrine of consideration.  As we will 
discuss in Part III, market competition will ensure fairness of 
the bargain and all that the Court has to do is to enforce the 
bargain. 
 
 B. Materiality Requirement as an Incentive to Withhold 
Information for the Sake of Settlements 
 
On the policy front, requiring materiality in supplemental 
disclosure is not sound either.  Normally, enforcement of a half-
completed bargain is beneficial to the society.  It allows 
freedom of individual action and exercise of judgment that 
increases productivity and efficient allocation of resources in 
the economy.40 
Supposedly, a court shall enforce the broad release when 
the material disclosures were given in exchange for that 
release.  However, since disclosing material information was 
only performance of a pre-existing legal duty, such a bargain 
shall not be enforced as a matter of public policy.  Enforcing a 
pre-existing legal duty gives rise to the strong possibility that 
“the promise was obtained by an express or implied threat to 
withhold performance of a legal duty, the promise does not 
have the presumptive social utility normally found in a 
bargain.”41  Thus, since all major transactions attract 
shareholder litigation and half of these cases are settled by 
disclosure-only settlements, the board of directors would 
 
37.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. § 72 cmt. d.  
40.  Id. § 72 cmt. b.  
41.  Id. § 73 cmt. a. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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benefit from hiding material information in the first place in 
anticipation of shareholder claims.  Enforcing the materiality 
requirement would only encourage the board to withhold 
disclosures that would be deemed material so that they can 
disclose such information to settle the highly-anticipated 
shareholder claims that would otherwise not be settled without 
a monetary compensation. 
 
 C. To Encourage or to Deter? What is the Public Policy? 
 
Normally, freedom of contract is respected in all Western 
jurisdictions.42  Freedom of contract has long been the leading 
public policy in Delaware and courts are supposed to enforce 
the plain terms of a contract freely entered by parties.43  Still, 
each system “must reserve the right to declare a contract void 
if it is illegally or morally offensive . . . or ‘contrary to public 
policy.’”44 
Since there are no concerns towards the legality of such 
settlements, the only normative objection over a freely-entered 
settlement would be the public policy ground.  As such, is there 
a public policy reason to deny all the disclosure-only 
settlements? 
In approving disclosure-only settlements, the Chancery 
Court has two conflicting public policy goals in mind.  The first 
is to lower the “deal tax.”  This means the court would have the 
 
42.  See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 380 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed., 1998). 
43.  See, e.g., Gildor v. Optical Solutions, Inc., No. 1416-N, 2006 WL 
4782348, at *7 n.17 (Del. Ch. Jun. 5, 2006) (“It is imperative that contracting 
parties know that a court will enforce a contract’s clear terms and will not 
judicially alter their bargain, so courts do not trump the freedom of contract 
lightly.”); Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 1146, 1152 
(Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]his court’s duty is to respect the contract freely entered 
into by all the members . . . .”); Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre 
Co., 843 A.2d 697, 712 (Del. Ch. 2004) (ruling that enforcing the “plain terms” 
of a contract furthers Delaware law’s goal of promoting reliable and efficient 
corporate and commercial laws); see also Marino v. Grupo Mundial Tenedora, 
S.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The policy of the Delaware 
Act is ‘to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to 
the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
44.  See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 42, at 380. 
11
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incentive to make a plaintiff’s non-meritorious claims go away 
as cheaply as possible by approving disclosure settlements and 
mooting the claims.  The second is to reject such settlements 
when it is not convincing that the plaintiff class received 
adequate representation and reasonableness or equivalence 
between “give” and “get” is preserved.  The Court is 
conscientious about preventing corporate defendants from 
being released from future claims without having them 
vigorously vetted by the plaintiff’s counsel. 
The first policy concern led to the routine approval of 
disclosure settlements before Rural Metro Corp., while the 
second concern led the Court to the materiality requirement set 
forth in Trulia.45  Both efforts were made to fulfill the Rule 23 
duty to ensure the reasonableness and substantive fairness of 
the two sides of the settlement.46 
Major mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals attract 
litigation, and most of them are weak claims that could not 
have succeeded in litigation.  The benefit of disclosure-only 
settlements is that when the plaintiff class receives additional 
information through the help of the plaintiff’s attorneys and 
recognizes that their initial claims were weak or groundless, 
the board of directors are released from liabilities relating to 
the transaction once and for all.  It also increases the 
transparency of deal making.47 
In light of this, the public policy would be to encourage 
quick settlement, especially non-monetary settlement, and the 
Chancery Court shall deem such settlements as beneficial.  
Therefore, when the defendants offer to settle the case by 
giving out supplemental information and a relatively small but 
substantial attorney fee for the plaintiff’s lawyers, the court 
would assume that negotiations have been conducted at arm’s 
length and in good faith.48  Therefore, the public policy of the 
 
45.  See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 
2016); In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 
2014). 
46.  See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23. 
47.  As a result, companies are willing to provide disclosures “that would 
have never been in a proxy statement 20 years ago” and such disclosures 
have, in Strine’s words “gotten increasingly more informative.”  Sumpter, 
supra note 18, at 687.  
48.  See In re Advanced Battery Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 298 F.R.D. 171, 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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court would be to promote deal efficiency by approving such 
settlements regardless of the materiality of the supplemental 
information. 
On the other hand, the Chancery Court has to face the 
challenge of evaluating such settlements through a non-
adversarial process.49  The Delaware Chancery Court has a 
legitimate concern that routine approval of all disclosure-based 
settlements would result in the loss of valuable claims through 
the broad release. 
The defendants would have the incentive to pay a 
relatively small fee to obtain a broad release50 as deal 
insurance.  Such an incentive is compatible with the plaintiff’s 
counsel’s incentive to obtain a quick attorney fee award by 
agreeing to the disclosure-only settlement.  Such broad release, 
which often includes all possible claims related to the events,51 
along with “claims that could not have been litigated in the 
settled action, such as federal securities claims,”52 is being seen 
as disproportionate to the benefit of the disclosures obtained. 
Chancellor Bouchard blamed the Court of Chancery’s 
willingness to give blind approval of such settlements as the 
cause of the explosion of deal litigation.53  Would blind denial 
unless disclosure is material work the magic then? 
Denial of all disclosure-only settlements would make the 
shareholder claims more expensive to settle, and would not 
necessarily preserve fairness.54  Plaintiffs might flee Delaware, 
 
179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
49.  In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 887. 
50.  Peter J. Walsh Jr. & Aaron R. Sims, Delaware Insider: Trulia and 
the Demise of “Disclosure Only” Settlements in Delaware, BUS. L. TODAY, Feb. 
2016, at 1.  
51.  See Brinckerhoff v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 385 
(Del. Ch. 2010). 
52.  Id. 
53.  See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 894 (“It is beyond doubt in my view 
that the dynamics described above, in particular the Court’s willingness in 
the past to approve disclosure settlements of marginal value and to routinely 
grant broad releases to defendants and six-figure fees to plaintiffs’ counsel in 
the process, have caused deal litigation to explode in the United States 
beyond the realm of reason.”). 
54.  Mathematically, equivalence cannot be achieved by requiring one 
side of the equation to have value without knowing whether the other side 
has any value.  Fairness is therefore not preserved when valuable disclosures 
that would otherwise not have been legally required to be disclosed is given 
13
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or the claims might be re-litigated after the denial, or 
defendants would have to provide a small monetary settlement 
($1 increase per share) as we have seen in Cox Radio.55  In the 
later scenario, stockholders might still be undercompensated. 
The only legitimate public policy remains that the 
Chancery Court shall ensure the fairness of the settlement.  
Approval of settlement agreement has depended and will 
continue to depend on whether the court has been convinced 
that the two sides of the contract are equivalent.  
Mathematically, equivalence cannot be achieved by requiring 
one side of the equation to have value without knowing 
whether the other side has any value. 
 
III. Market Mechanisms and Judicial Assessment 
 
 A. Enforcing the Bargain: Achieving Fairness Through 
Market 
 
As it has been discussed, fairness remains the only criteria 
in approving disclosure-only settlement.  The core argument of 
this article is that fairness of disclosure-only settlement is 
achieved by enforcing the bargain as it is.  In contract law, 
normative doctrines and theories do not concern about the 
fairness of the terms so long as they were freely negotiated in 
the market place.  Fairness does not seem to matter in contract 
law but fairness is otherwise preserved through the use of the 
doctrine of unconscionability.  The idea is that when the 
market is competitive, market information would freely flow 
and everyone would have access to the market price.  As a 
result, when negotiation was at arm’s length, the settlement 
would normally be reached at market price as no one would be 
willing to give more or receive less when they have access to 
market price.  If it was found out later that the settlement was 
induced by misrepresentation or omission of material facts, the 
settlement could be rescinded based on the doctrine of fraud or 
 
in exchange of meritless claims.  
55.  See In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No. 4461-VCP, 
2010 WL 1806616 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010), at *1. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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misrepresentation.56  If the two sides of the settlement were 
overall imbalanced, the performance of the settlement can be 
denied.  If settlement terms are deemed unconscionable, the 
settlement can be set aside.  A combination of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability can result in rescission of the 
agreement even after a settlement is reached between two 
parties and approved by the court.57  In addition to that, gross 
disparity alone will be enough to result in a denial of specific 
performance.58 
 
     1. Fairness Matters in Contract Law 
 
Formally, as Stephen Smith describes, fairness does not 
play in a role in contract law theory.59  He went further to 
argue that substantive fairness has to be excluded from a 
ground under the heading of unconscionability.60  The majority 
view is that just price does not have a doctrinal place in 
contract law theory, and fairness is considered irrelevant in 
contract law.61  Once a defender of substantive fairness,62 
Stephen Smith observed that support for substantive fairness 
is not part of discourse of contract law, nor is it defended by 
many contract law scholars.63  It has been said that the idea of 
“fair price” is meaningless in a modern economy and 
inconsistent with the idea of freedom of contract.64  However, 
even Smith had to admit that the lack of fairness would create 
problems: it will result in more unjust redistribution;65 it will 
reduce contracting;66 it will harm people’s abilities to plan an 
 
56.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. Law. Inst. 
1981).  
57.  See id. § 71. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Stephen A. Smith, In Defence of Substantive Fairness, 112 LAW Q. 
REV. 138, 138-39 (1996) [hereinafter Substantive Fairness]. 
60.  Id. 
61.  See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY 
OF CONTRACT LAW 118, 191 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698 (1981). 
62.  See generally Substantive Fairness, supra note 59. 
63.  STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 357 (2004). 
64.  Id. at 354. 
65.  Substantive Fairness, supra note 59, at 146-48. 
66.  Id. at 148-49. 
15
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autonomous life.67 
According to Smith, substantively unfair bargains will 
make the already unjust distribution even more unjust because 
losers in unfair bargains are usually the less well-off of the two 
contracting parties.68  Also, non-competitive pricing in a 
competitive market will reduce contracting.69  On the other 
hand, an imposition of normal prices will benefit even those 
who are unsure of normal prices.70  Contracting at abnormal 
prices also harms people’s ability to lead an autonomous life as 
our ability to plan the life is built upon the preservation of our 
purchasing power and abnormal prices would upset plans and 
one’s ability to control and direct their lives.71 
As Zweigert and Kötz observed: commutative justice has 
always been seen to require a certain equivalence between 
performance and counter-performance.72  The gross disparity 
between the performance and counter-performance will open a 
contract up for rescission in virtually all major jurisdictions.73 
Normally, contract law does not require equality in 
exchange, but gross disparity between the two sides of the 
contract would allow courts to avoid the contract terms as 
unconscionable.  As Corbin describes, “adequacy of 
 
67.  Id. at 151-56. 
68.  Id. at 147-48. 
69.  Id. at 148-49. 
70.  Id. at 150. 
71.  Substantive Fairness, supra note 59, at 150-52. 
72.  ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 42, at 328. 
73.  Nominal consideration is not supported by either American or 
English law.  See Restatement of Contracts (Second)–A Rejection of Nominal 
Consideration?, 1 VAL. U.L. REV. 102 (1966); P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 126-29 (1995). American courts often apply 
unconscionability to correct unfair contracts. French law traditionally 
requires a counter-performance to reflect consideration of the real interest 
and be genuine and reasonable in order to maintain the cause  of the 
contract. See Judith Rochfeld, A Future for la cause? Observations of a French 
Jurist, in REFORMING THE FRENCH LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, 73, 81 (John 
Carwright, Stefan Vogenauer, & Simon Whittaker eds. 2009); After the 
abolition of cause in 2016 in French civil law reforms, the new article 1143 
established a new doctrine of violence économique that serves the same 
function. In German law, gross disparity (grobes Missverhältnis) can also 
render a contract void for violation of good morals (gute Sitten). See BGB 
§ 138 and Bundesgerichtshof, 9 November 1961, BB, 1962, 156 (the court 
held that an interest rate of 45% should be held invalid as contrary to good 
morals). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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consideration is not required to be adequate in the sense of 
equality in value.”74  Corbin also observed that judges, by 
acting also as chancellors, will avoid enforcement of an 
unconscionable bargain when the consideration is grossly 
inadequate.75  He supplied two reasons: one reason is that the 
gross inadequacy may be evidence of fraud, mistake, or undue 
influence;76 the other reason is that the relevant factors 
accompanying the inadequacy would fit into the concepts of 
fraud, duress, misrepresentation and undue influence.77 
The Second Restatement of Contracts, in its comment, 
insists that usually overall imbalance involves factors other 
than mere overall imbalance to qualify the contract as 
unconscionable.78  However, it also admits that “gross disparity 
in the values exchanged . . . may be sufficient ground, without 
more, for denying specific performance.”79  The Restatement 
gives courts broad discretion to avoid contract terms that would 
have unconscionable results.80 
 
     2. Gross Disparity in Exchange as Unconscionable 
 
Scholars might not agree on whether the value of the 
objects exchanged through contracts is subjective or objective, 
or whether there is a just price.  However, it is the consensus 
that so long as the market functions, the Court shall enforce 
the bargain as they are.  Fairness would be achieved by 
enforcing the bargains.  When the market malfunctions, 
exploitation will likely occur when parties no longer have 
access to the market price.  When this happens, 
 
74.  ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 188 (1952). 
75.  Id. at 188. 
76.  Id. at 185. 
77.  Id. at 188. 
78.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 
1981). 
79.  Id. See also  Marks v. Gates, 154 F. 481, 483 (9th Cir.1907) 
(inadequacy of consideration sufficient ground for withholding specific 
performance if it is so gross as to render the contract unconscionable); 
Frank’s Maintenance & Eng’g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 42 
Ill. Dec. 25, 31–32, 408 N.E.2d 403, 409–10 (1980) (“Unconscionability can be 
either procedural or substantive or a combination of both.”). 
80.  Id. § 208. 
17
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unconscionability denies a severely unequal bargain. 
 
The Bargain Principle 
 
Melvin Eisenberg, a doctrinal scholar without any 
philosophical or ideological subscriptions, explains why the 
bargain principle of contract law—a theory taken literally from 
the black letter law—is a sound theory that serves both ends of 
contract law, efficiency and fairness, without a normative 
regard for fairness.81 
 
The bargain principle can be summarized as simply as 
“‘courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration’ or 
‘mere inadequacy of consideration will not void a contract.’”82  
Eisenberg converts it to a formulation that states that 
“damages for unexcused breach of a bargain promise should 
invariably be measured by the value the promised performance 
would have had to the plaintiff, rather than, and regardless of, 
the cost or value of the performance for which the defendant’s 
promise was exchanged.”83  In other words, “a bargain promise 
should be enforced to its full extent.”84  Normally, in a perfect 
market,85 fairness of the terms can never be reviewed by the 
court because the price reached through a bargained promise 
would be economically efficient and fair.  Arguments for 
efficient price could be found in that the value is subjective, 
credit transactions would only be encouraged if the expectation 
that bargain promise would be kept is preserved, contract price 
 
81.  See Melvin Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982). 
82.  See id. at 745.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
83.  Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 745. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 746 (citing EDWIN MANSFIELD, 
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 196-97 (3d ed. 1979) (A perfectly 
competitive market is defined as “a homogeneous commodity (which may 
consist of either goods or services); a marketplace at which perfect cost-free 
information concerning price is readily available (hereinafter referred to as a 
homogeneous marketplace); productive resources that are sufficiently mobile 
that pricing decisions readily influence their allocation; and participants 
whose market share is so small that none can affect the commodity’s price, so 
that each takes the market price as given by outside forces.”)).  
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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is the most efficient price that best allocates the factors 
necessary for the commodity’s production.86  Such a price would 
also be the fair price, as, in a perfectly competitive market, 
contract price normally equals the benefits conferred, 
everybody would use the market price when it is available, and 
any lower-than fair price would be eliminated by market 
completion.87 
However, review of objective fairness of contracts would be 
appropriate when perfectly competitive markets are not 
available.88  As Eisenberg observed, the principle of 
unconscionability permits enforcement of a promise to be 
limited on the basis of unfair price alone.89  Unconscionability, 
as described in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, only 
addresses gross disparity.90 
If Eisenberg is right, fairness is protected by contract law 
and would be achieved through settlement agreement so long 
as it resulted from a free bargain between the plaintiff class 
and the defendant corporation and the market was competitive.  
If Eisenberg is right, the plaintiff class and the plaintiff’s 
counsel who have meritless claims would settle for valueless 
supplemental disclosures, and the plaintiff class who have 
greater chances of proving defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty 
would not settle unless they receive a monetary settlement that 
equals the value of their claims, multiplying the likelihood of 
the success in trial minus the litigation cost.91  In this view, 
courts shall not review the fairness of the settlement terms, but 
rather the bargaining process, such as adequacy of 
representation or bargaining in good faith.  The Chancery 
Court can justifiably refuse to approve disclosure-only 
 
86.  Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 745-46. 
87.  Id. at 747. 
88.  Id. at 748-54. 
89.  Id. at 753. 
90.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
91.  For those who do not think that the claims would be adequately 
investigated, the Chancery Court has been looking into the efforts of plaintiff 
counsel to determine appropriate attorney fee awards and would not approve 
settlements or fee awards if they did not think the case was vigorously 
vetted.  See, e.g., In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 
6574–CS, 2013 WL 1191738 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013). 
19
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settlements when they are not convinced that sufficient vetting 
had taken place. 
 
Fairness in Exchange 
 
Among contract theorists, James Gordley, of Aristotelian 
tradition, and Peter Benson, of Kantian tradition, are the two 
leading advocates in recognizing the importance of fairness of 
price in contract law.  Still, they both agree that only gross 
disparity in consideration shall be remedied by law.  But they 
differ as to whether equality in exchange shall be the standard 
rule, or if it is only the baseline.  Gordley argues that all 
deviations from just price are entitled to relief to preserve the 
purchasing power of the parties and the pre-existing 
distribution of wealth.92  While Benson thinks that equivalence 
in exchange preserves the wills of the parties, he agrees that 
only gross disparity calls for correction.93 
The two disagree on whether there is a just price for each 
contract and whether a just price can be reached or only 
approached.  Still, both would agree that a gross deviation from 
the market price would call for remedy in contract law, but for 
different reasons.  To Gordley, only gross disparity is worth 
pursuing for practical and evidentiary reasons.  To Benson, 
gross disparity is evidence for vice of consent and calls for 
explanation. 
 
When Value is Objective and there is a Just Price 
 
Gordley, writing from Aristotelian tradition, thinks that 
just price is the market price under competitive conditions.94  
Just price “varies from day to day and from region to region.”95  
Such a price reflects need, scarcity, and cost.96  According to 
Aristotle, every contract of exchange is an act of “voluntary 
 
92.  See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587 
(1981). 
93.  See BENSON, supra note 61, at 191. 
94.  See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, 
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 361 (2006). 
95.  Id.  
96.  Id.  
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commutative justice.”97  Therefore, a party shall not be made 
poorer or richer over contracting, but may become poorer or 
richer in the future.98  There is no reason to charge a higher 
price or buy at a lower price if one is really making an 
exchange and has access to the market price.  In making an 
exchange, no reasonable person intends to enrich the other 
party at their own expenses.  However, one can become richer 
by buying low and selling high.  One can become poorer by 
doing the opposite.  Since the market price changes constantly, 
all one needs to do is to sell the same object he bought at a 
different location where the market price is higher, or on a 
different day when the market price is higher.  Thus, the 
change of wealth happens through a series of contract 
transactions rather than one.  In each one of these 
transactions, the pre-existing wealth and allocation of 
resources between the parties are to be preserved. 
However, though just price is approachable and equality in 
exchange can be realized, not every disparity will be remedied.  
From the Roman rule of laesio enormis to the French doctrine 
of lesion,99 for practical reasons, only gross disparity can be 
remedied.  Such reasons might be that: courts are not in the 
best position to determine what the just price was when the 
contract was entered; price that seemed unfair after 
contracting might be fair upon conclusion – a fair bet at price 
fluctuation is fair; and it might not be economical to remedy 
every unfair price.100 
To Gordley, the object of contract has an objective value 
that equals the fair market price, parties are willing to contract 
to exchange only because they themselves place a higher 
subjective value on the things they exchanged.  According to 
 
97.  Id. at 292. 
98.  Id. at 363. 
99.  In Roman law, a contract could be rescinded when a thing was sold 
for less than half of the just price.  A buyer can choose to either pay the 
difference between the just price and the price paid or rescind the 
transaction.  See James Gordley, Contract in Pre-Commercial Societies and in 
Western History, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2-41 
(J.C.B. Mohr, ed. 1997).  French law gives relief to the unfair contract when 
the sale of land is for less than five-twelfths of the market value.  CODE CIVIL 
[C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1674 (Fr.). 
100.  Gordley, supra note 92, at 1652-54. 
21
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Gordley’s account, the price reached in a competitive market is 
the just price, and so long as parties negotiated at arm’s length, 
courts shall enforce the terms unless the price was severely 
wrong.  The end result is that a range of normal considerations 
would be acceptable and only extremely unfair settlements 
would be subject to relief. 
 
When Value is Subjective and there is No Just Price 
 
Benson sees contract as a transfer of ownership and the 
contemporary common law contract theory as a coherent 
unity.101  Consideration requires two sides of the contract to be 
qualitatively different, and unconscionability completes the 
theory by requiring two sides to be identical in value.102 
In Benson’s view, contract law does not require equality in 
exchange, but requires equivalence in exchange, which will 
preserve equality in value though value is entirely subjective.  
By Benson’s account, parties are presumed to have the 
intention to transact for equal value,103 at least not the grossly 
lacking of equivalence.104  In his view, no one is legally obliged 
to transact for equal value.105  A party can waive the receipt of 
equal value through assumption of risk or by a donative 
intent.106  In these two circumstances, gross inequality cannot 
be remedied if the inequality has objectively been willed by the 
party.107 
However, a contract must honor each party’s capacity to 
receive equal value.  In the absence of donative intent and 
assumption of risk, gross lack of equivalence in an exchange is 
voidable.108  Unconscionability supplements contractual liberty 
allowed by consideration with contractual fairness.109 
 
 
101.  See BENSON, supra note 61, at 118.  
102.  See id. at 193-95. 
103.  See id. at 187. 
104.  See id. at 118. 
105.  See id. at 191. 
106.  See id., at 191. 
107.  See BENSON, supra note 61, at 191. 
108.  See id. 
109.  See id. at 184. 
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Different from Gordley’s account, Benson thinks all the 
normal prices are competitive prices and values are subjective 
to the parties.  Benson argues that “[a] competitive market 
price is an ideal notion which obtains at long-term equilibrium.  
It is only approached, and never fully realized, by actually 
existing market systems, even on the supposition that these 
are competitive.”110  As a result, there will be a range of 
competitive prices and they are all enforceable.  
Unconscionability only deals with a gross lack of equivalence.  
Contracts can be avoided when the price falls out of the 
baseline and parties’ intention to transact at equal value can 
no longer be construed in light of the gross lack of equivalence.  
Benson’s account of contractual fairness is what I call 
subjective fairness.  However, even this subjective account has 
objective criterion, which is the gross lack of equivalence.  By 
Benson’s account, in Trulia, the plaintiff class is presumed to 
intend to transact for equal value in reaching the settlement.  
Consideration only requires the two sides to be distinctively 
different.  Once they are, they can possibly be construed as 
equivalent unless there was gross lack of equivalence as 
measured by market prices.  Such gross lack of equivalence is 
seen as evidence for violation of parties’ intention.  So, we can 
infer that happens when an overbroad release was obtained in 
exchange for disclosure of therapeutic value, in Benson’s 
theory, gross lack of equivalence will warrant the avoidance of 
the settlement, even if the two sides are distinctively different. 
 
 B. The Plaintiff Firm Market 
 
The incentive divergence between the plaintiff’s counsel 
and the plaintiff class had led to the non-adversarial nature of 
the settlement agreement negotiation according to the court.111  
This incentive divergence further led to the systemic problem 
and market failure that eventually led to the over-
compensation of the plaintiff’s counsel and under-compensation 
of the plaintiff class.  The main complaint is that the corporate 
 
110.  See id. at 190. 
111.  See, e.g., In re Trulia Inc., Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 893 
(Del. Ch. 2016). 
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defendant will willingly pay the plaintiff’s attorneys for broad 
releases.  Many plaintiff firms make it a business model to 
obtain such an award as early as possible by reaching the 
disclosure settlement as cheaply and quickly as possible.112  
Several articles have been written to propose cures for the 
problem.113  Such proposals include the influential one that 
requires materiality in approving disclosure-only settlement,114 
adjusting attorney’s fee award according to the benefits 
conferred to the plaintiff class,115 and shifting the attorney’s fee 
to the plaintiff class.116  However, the current practice does 
embody functional market mechanisms that will make the 
incentives of the plaintiff firms and the plaintiff class 
compatible. 
When there is a meritorious case, the market will give 
plaintiff firms higher incentives to commit more resources in 
proving their theory and achieving a more beneficial 
settlement.  After all, incentives between the plaintiff’s counsel 
and the plaintiff class can be realigned when filing meritorious 
claims and achieving significant benefits for the shareholders 
can result in seven-figure attorney’s fees, as it so happened in 
Rural Metro Corp.,117 and filing weak claims, obtaining low 
value disclosures that moot claims that would lead to a five-
figure award as in Sauer-Danfoss.118 
The Court does not have the capacity to go provide the 
appropriate due diligence on the merits of the claims, but that 
should not concern most litigants, commentators, or 
practitioners.  Since virtually all major mergers and 
acquisitions transactions attract litigation, the Court can often 
tell that there is little chance for the plaintiff class to obtain 
any monetary settlement in the first place.  Approving a class 
action settlement that exchanges non-meritorious claims for a 
 
112.  See Friedlander, supra note 14. 
113.  See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 14; Griffith, supra note 18; 
Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18; Sumpter, supra note 18. 
114.  See Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18. 
115.  See Sumpter, supra note 18. 
116.  See Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 18. 
117.  See Friedlander, supra note 14.   
118.  See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holder Litig., 65 A.3d 1116 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (the court lowered the $750,000 award requested by the plaintiff’s 
attorney for attorney’s fees to $75,000 based on the merits of the work done). 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
JIANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/18  12:31 AM 
2018 DISCLOSURE-ONLY SETTLEMENTS 593 
broad release meets the fairness standard in Rule 23 of 
Delaware Court of Chancery Rules.  On the other hand, the 
materiality requirement, regardless of the merits of the claims 
and availability of material information, will incentivize 
extortion and harassment toward the deep pockets.  Also, the 
law firms that have built a business model for only delivering 
non-monetary settlements with the sole purpose of obtaining a 
six-figure attorney fee will not be sustainable in the market 
place.  Such shops who rely on soliciting small investors and 
being selected by the Court as lead counsel in class action 
litigation will not likely succeed in landing representations 
when they have developed a reputation for only being able to 
deliver non-monetary settlements. 
Based on a recent empirical study on the effectiveness of 
plaintiff law firms in mergers and acquisitions litigation and 
shareholder claims, the presence of identified top law firms is 
“significantly and positively associated with a higher 
probability of lawsuit success.”119  These top law firms are the 
entrepreneurial firms that vet the claims properly and devote 
substantial human and financial resources necessary to 
uncover a theory of breach of fiduciary duty.  With such 
transparent market information, the firms that have developed 
the reputation of suing on every deal with “hastily drafted 
complaints”120 will not likely be selected by the Chancery Court 
who select firms based on reputation and merits.  Once 
selected, their proposed settlement would undergo more critical 
and severe scrutiny by the court before the approval of the 
settlement. 
Consequently, shareholders with meritorious claims would 
be after the first-tier firms, and first-tier firms would have the 
 
119.  See generally C.N.V. Krishanan, Steven D. Solomon, & Randall S. 
Thomas, Who Are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law 
Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. ECON. R. 88 (2016).  
120.  Many complaints were filed upon the announcement of a 
transaction without committing the time and resources necessary to vet the 
claims.  An extreme example can be found in In re Cox Communications.  A 
proposal to acquire all of the public shares of Cox was announced at 4:06 am 
on August 2, 2004.  By 8:36 am of that same day, the first of “a flurry of 
hastily drafted complaints” was filed with the Court.  See Sumpter, supra 
note 18, at 680 (quoting In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 
604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005)).  
25
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luxury to choose from quality claims.  The second-tier firms 
would have to settle for weak claims and it will make it even 
harder for them to prove their theories effectively and 
convincingly.  Moreover, the plaintiffs would also be more 
likely to pursue and succeed in malpractice claims against 
these second-tier firms who might have cost the shareholders 
valuable claims.  Since the plaintiff firm’s markets favor 
merits, it would be much harder for the weaker firms with 
weaker claims to survive in the marketplace in the long run. 
Moreover, the Court has the discretionary power to deny 
approval of the settlement when it is clear that there is gross 
disparity between the two sides of the settlement, which is a 
more effective tool to ensure fairness than requiring one side of 
the exchange to have value without knowing whether the other 
side has value.  As it has been suggested by the Court, there 
are two things that the Court can do to prevent the imbalance 
between give and get.  The Court sets the attorney’s fee award 
corresponding to the benefit conveyed to the plaintiff class.  
The idea is that when the fee award is low enough to become 
non-profitable and all the counsel could deliver is a disclosure 
that has marginal and therapeutic value to the class, it would 
discourage plaintiff firms from taking on cases that are 
frivolous or invest more in proving the theory.  The second tool 
is to refuse the proposed settlement when the release is too 
broad and conveys significant value compared to the marginal 
value of the information the plaintiff class received. 
The materiality requirement proposal accepted by the 
court aims to disincentivize the plaintiff firms from suing on 
every case and force them to screen out frivolous claims.121  
However, a heightened standard for approval could make it 
more difficult for non-meritorious claims to go away, and go 
away cheaply. 
As we have discussed, the first tier of top firms has the 
resources to investigate and screen out meritless claims, while 
the second-tier firms do not have the financial or human 
resources to do the same.  Logically, they will either flee 
Delaware and sue in other jurisdictions or turn away most 
cases and deny plaintiffs access to litigation.  Moreover, not 
 
121.  See Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18.  
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approving meager disclosures would be a denial of “deal 
insurance” or a punishment to the defendant, and denial of 
settlement leaves matters unresolved even if the court thought 
the claims were so weak that the plaintiff should abandon the 
case with prejudice.122  The reality is that the defendants will 
provide modest monetary settlements in addition to the 
disclosures, as we have seen in In re Cox Radio Inc. 
Shareholders Litigation.123  Even though the monetary 
settlement of $1 increase per share only provided modest 
benefit,124 the Court will not second guess the monetary 
consideration and have to approve the settlement with broad 
release.125  As a result, this practice might still result in under-
compensation of the stockholders, which makes it more 
expensive to dispose of weak claims. 
Imposition of materiality assumes there was no good faith 
in bargaining because of the divergent incentive of the 
plaintiff’s counsel, all the shareholder claims are meritorious, 
and there was breach of fiduciary duty by failing to provide 
adequate material information in the preliminary proxy 
statement by the board.126  Apparently, these premises are not 
always satisfied and the court is not in a good position to 
measure the value of the benefits that supplemental 
information conveys to the putative class, unless there is 
obvious gross disparity.  The imposed materiality requirement 
assumes gross disparity exists in all disclosure-only 
settlements, which is likely not the case.  On the other hand, 
 
122.  See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, In re Medicis Pharm. Corp. 
S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 1614336 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2014) (No. 7857-CS) (“I 
understand, particularly from the defendants’ side, the reality that what I’ve 
done probably, you know, in some ways has a punishing effect, because I 
don’t know what else is out there that this leaves unresolved.”); In re 
Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574-CS, 2013 
WL1191738 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (“If the plaintiffs believe their claims are 
as weak as their brief presents, then they’re obviously welcome to dismiss 
their claims with prejudice as to themselves and to move on if they don’t wish 
to prosecute.”). 
123.  See In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4461-VCP, 2010 
WL 1806616, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010).   
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at *23. 
126.  See id.  See also Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 
567 (App. Div. 2017). 
27
JIANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/18  12:31 AM 
596 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38.2 
enforcement of such a requirement creates an ethical dilemma 
that disclosing all material information would not entitle the 
company to the benefit of a disclosure-only settlement while 
withholding material information, a breach of fiduciary duty, 
makes it easy to settle shareholder claims. 
 
 C. Judicial Assessment of Merits and Attorney Fees 
 
For the market mechanisms to function, the conflicted 
incentives of the plaintiff’s counsel have to be compatible with 
those of the plaintiff class.  It is essential that the level of 
attorney’s fees corresponds to the merits of the disclosures 
obtained through the work of attorneys.  In applying its 
discretion and judicial assessment,127 the Chancery Court has 
adopted meticulous standards in measuring both the benefits 
of the disclosures and the level of attorney fees that should be 
awarded.  Sugarland factors provide the guidance for the 
Chancery Court to determine an appropriate award.  Such 
factors include: 
 
(i) the amount of time and effort applied to the 
case by counsel for the plaintiffs; (ii) the relative 
complexities of the litigation; (iii) the standing 
and ability of petitioning counsel; (iv) the 
contingent nature of the litigation; (v) the stage 
at which the litigation ended; (vi) whether the 
plaintiff can rightly receive all the credit for the 
benefit conferred or only a portion thereof; and 







127.  ‘‘[T]he amount of an attorneys’ fee award is within the discretion of 
the court.’’ In re Plains Res. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 071-N, 2005 WL 
332811, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 2005). 
128.  Id., at *3 (listing the factors laid out in Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. 
Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149 (Del. 1980)). 
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8
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     1. Three-Scale Fee Awards 
 
The Sugarland factors do not provide an effective tool for 
the Chancery Court to quantify an appropriate award given the 
fact that disclosure is “an intangible, non-quantifiable 
benefit.”129  Nevertheless, the Court has developed a three-scale 
system in Sauer-Danfoss that measures the benefits conveyed 
by the disclosures and places each case on a scale based on the 
quality of the disclosures and looks to “fee awards granted for 
similar disclosures.”130 This fee evaluating system works to 
realign the incentives between the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ 
counsel without a materiality requirement. 
Traditionally, most awards are in the range of $400,000 to 
$500,000.  Chancellor Laster uses this range as the baseline 
award for “one or two meaningful disclosures.”131  Meaningful 
disclosures can be “previously withheld projections or 
undisclosed conflicts faced by fiduciaries or their advisors.”132  
The award can be downgraded to the lower scale for disclosures 
of “questionable quality.”133  And higher awards are available 
for “particularly significant or exceptional disclosures.”134 
At the default level, Chancellor Laster found cases with 
awards ranging from $300,000 to $525,000.  In this range, as 
Philip Sumpter observed, a few conditions have to be met: “(1) 
plaintiffs obtain a single meaningful disclosure, or (2) plaintiffs 
obtain lesser disclosures, but do ‘real work’ in litigating the 
case.”135 
To qualify for the default level of award, all the plaintiff’s 
counsel must do is to obtain “one meaningful quanta of 
information.”136  A company’s financial projection and banker’s 
analysis are regarded as meaningful.137  However, such 
 
129.  In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holder Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del. 
Ch. 2011). 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id.  
133.  Id.  
134.  Id. at 1137. 
135.  Sumpter, supra note 18, at 708. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. at 708-10 (discussing In re Zenith, where the Court awarded 
$400,000 and “described the disclosure of management projections that were 
29
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disclosures are no longer sufficient to pass the Trulia court’s 
material standard.138 
Counsel’s expended effort is more important to the Court 
than the time spent because it shows proof of adequate 
representation of a plaintiff’s interest.139  The effort might be 
measured by the number of depositions undertaken,140 whether 
those depositions were offensive141 or only confirmatory,142 
whether the case was settled before or after the injunction 
hearing,143 whether full briefing and argument on application 
for preliminary injunction was prepared,144 and whether a 
preliminary injunction was granted,145 among other factors. 
The award would be downgraded to the lower-than-
$300,000-range when the disclosures only convey meager 
benefits146 and the claims themselves are so weak that it 
 
used by the company’s banker in connection with its fairness opinion as a 
meaningful, or ‘major’ disclosure,” and Turberg v. Arcsight, where “the Court 
awarded $500,000 in attorneys’ fees because the plaintiffs obtained 
previously-undisclosed banker’s analysis.”); see In re Zenith Elec. Corp., 329 
F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2003); Turberg v. Arcsight, Inc., C.A. No. 5821-VCL, 2011 
WL 4445653 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 2011). 
138.  See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. 2016) 
(holding synergy figures regarding financial advisor’s value-creation analysis 
and information regarding individual company multiples used in financial 
advisor’s selected transaction analysis were not material and thus did not 
provide adequate consideration for settlement.). 
139.  See Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1139 (“When an entrepreneurial 
plaintiffs’ firm engages in adversarial discovery, obtains documents from 
third parties, pursues motions to compel, and litigates merits-oriented 
issues”).  See also Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement “Problem”: 
The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 258 
(2007). 
140.  See generally In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 
2008). 
141.  Id. 
142.  See, e.g., Augenbaum v. Forman, No. C.A. 1569-N, 2006 WL 
1716916 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2006). 
143.  See, e.g., Globis Capital Partners, LP v. SafeNet, Inc., C.A. No. 
2772-VCS, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 213, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2007) (settled 
after injunction hearing and a $1,200,000 fee was awarded).  See also 
Augenbaum, 2006 WL 1716916, at *2 (the case was settled without an 
injunction hearing, as a result, the fee was only $225,000). 
144.  See generally In re Lear Corp., 926 A.2d. at 94. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Sumpter, supra note 18 at 715. 
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should not have been brought in the first place.147  It can also 
arise from the fact that the counsel “claimed excessive 
hours,”148 the majority of which “derived no benefits.”149  Also, 
settling too early without achieving a solid benefit is another 
cause for a downgrade.150  Lastly, an award over $500,000 
requires significant and exceptional disclosures. This happens 
when the plaintiff’s counsel took a risk151 and hit a “home 
run.”152 
In such cases, the plaintiff’s counsel might have taken ten 
offensive depositions, two defensive depositions, and secured a 
preliminary injunction.153  They received such disclosures as 
information about CEO’s conflict of interest and CEO’s role in 
negotiation and the sale process,154 or they had prepared a full 
brief, delivered an argument at injunction hearing, and settled 
only after an injunction hearing.155  They also received 
extensive detailed descriptions of banker’s fairness opinions 
and underlying analyses, two complete bankers’ books, and 
more than 100 pages of disclosure.156  In these two cases, the 
fees were set, respectively, at $800,000 and $1,200,000.157 
As we have seen, meticulous and articulate standards in 
awarding attorney’s fees have been established.  Minimal 
benefits will qualify for minimal fees and meaningful 
disclosures will justify a hefty fee.  Such guidelines shall be 
sufficient to measure the work of the plaintiff’s counsel and 
make sure their incentives and interests align with the 
 
147.  Id. at 719. 
148.  Id. at 720. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. at 721. 
151.  In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holder Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1140 (Del. 
Ch. 2011). 
152.  See Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 34, Globis Capital 
Partners, LP v. Safenet, Inc., 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 
2007) (C.A. No. 2772-VCS). 
153.  See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 
2008). 
154.  Id.  
155.  See generally, e.g., Globis Capital Partners, LP v. SafeNet, Inc., 
C.A. No. 2772-VCS, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *8 (Dec. 20, 2007). 
156.  Id. 
157.  See In re Lear Corp., 926 A.2d at 94; Globis Capital, 2007 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 237 at *1. 
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plaintiff class. 
Application of such principles can be seen in cases in both 
pre- and post-Trulia periods.  Fairness and balance between 
give and get matter, but materiality does not appear in both 
pre and post-Trulia periods.  When the Court is not convinced 
by the counsel’s effort that the claims have been vigorously 
investigated, neither settlement nor fee award would be 
approved.  Wherever a settlement was approved and fee was 
awarded, the fee award is entirely merit-based and fits in one 
of the three scales discussed above. 
In a 2013 case, then-Chancellor Strine declined to approve 
a disclosure settlement in In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. 
Shareholders Litigation158 even when the traditional thing to 
do would be to certify a class, approve the disclosure 
settlement, and award an attorney fee.159  Strine admitted that 
it was rare to place a duty on the court to “make sure that 
classes are effectively represented . . . .”160  The court is 
required “to act even in the absence of any kind of opposition to 
a settlement.”161  Though Strine emphasized that the 
additional information was not meaningful, not to mention 
material, this was not the true reason he acted untraditionally.  
It is the imbalance between the possibility of loss of a valuable 
claim and the certainty that information that is of little utility 
that warranted the rejection of the disclosure settlement.  As 
Strine stated, “I don’t have any confidence, unfortunately, that 
there was a real plaintiff behind this monitoring counsel.”162  
Strine suspects that a more diligent plaintiff might be able to 
come forward with a damages action in the future.  The 
likelihood of this incident and, more importantly, the value of 
this future option are more desirable to the Court than the 
virtually valueless supplemental information.163  In serious 
doubt of the equivalence or equality in the settlement, Strine 
denied the settlement in the absence of any opposition and 
 
158.  In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6574-CS, 
2013 WL 1191738, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013).  
159.  Id.  
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. at *2. 
163.  Id. 
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decided to evaluate the merits of the case through an 
adversarial process.  The sua sponte rejection without an 
objection was to ensure that the Court did not approve a class 
action settlement that was clearly unfair. 
In Riverbed,164 a case of similar facts decided in 2015, the 
court approved the settlement despite the fact that the 
disclosures cannot be found to be of any value except for small, 
therapeutic value to the class.  Vice Chancellor Glasscock 
confirmed that this was the situation where, in Chancellor 
Allen’s expression, “the plaintiffs have achieved for the Class a 
peppercorn.”165  The court was the least bothered by the fact 
that the benefit conferred by such settlement was 
insubstantial.  I think that what really concerned the court was 
whether there was a disparity between what the plaintiffs give 
up and what they receive.  The Riverbed court sided with 
Chancellor Allen in that a peppercorn is sufficient to support a 
settlement so long as it is equal to the merits of the claims 
given up.166  In this case, the court was convinced that what 
was given up by the plaintiff was “basically nil” because, by the 
plaintiff’s counsel’s own admission, they did not have a viable 
claim under federal securities law.167  Again, value, benefits, 
and materiality of the disclosure do not matter to the Delaware 
Court of Chancery.  The parity between the two sides of the 
settlement does.  It might appear that this decision was a clear 
deviation from Transatlantic Holdings and Trulia, I, however, 
see the consistencies.  Here, even though the court was 
convinced that the disclosure was valueless, so were the 
plaintiff’s claims.  The court relied on the testimony of 
plaintiff’s counsel about the viability of the claims in 
determining that the give from the class was “basically nil.”168  
The parity between the two sides of the settlement warranted 
the approval.  Still, given the merits of the disclosures, the 
Court lowered the requested $500,000 fee to a fee that is within 
 
164.  In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 
2015 WL 5458041, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015).  
165.  Id. at *5. 
166.  Id. (“[A] positive result of small therapeutic value to the Class 
which can support . . . a settlement, but only where what is given up is of 
minimal value.”). 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
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the default range, $200,000.169  Again, fairness matters, 
materiality of disclosures does not. 
Interestingly, in a recent post-Trulia case in Delaware, 
Vice Chancellor Glasscock, the Riverbed judge, reaffirmed the 
materiality test in Trulia but awarded a fee for supplemental 
disclosures that mooted four disclosure claims and ruled that 
materiality was not required.170  He argued that materiality 
does not apply to the award of attorney’s fees when there was 
no settlement and a modest benefit of the supplemental 
disclosure would support the award of attorney’s fees.171  The 
plaintiffs sought $275,000 in attorney fees, the court awarded 
only $50,000.172 
 
2. Scope of the Release Proportionate to the Scope of the 
Disclosures 
 
The Chancery Court consistently refuses to approve 
releases when the scope of the release is too broad compared to 
the benefits conveyed by the disclosure.173  This practice works 
to minimize global release and the loss of valuable claims.  
Again, the success of such practice does not rely on having a 
materiality requirement. 
 
 D. Gordon v. Verizon: The Best Interest of the Putative 
Class is to Enforce the Bargain 
 
New York courts did not follow Delaware in imposing a 
materiality requirement.  On the other hand, they enforce the 
bargain when they are convinced that there was a presence of 
bargaining in good faith.174  In this recent post-Trulia case, 
 
169.  Id. at *8. 
170.  In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 WL 
4146425, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016). 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. 
173.  See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. 
Ch. 2016); In re Medics Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 7857-CS, 2014 WL 
1614336, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2014); In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. 
S’holders Litig., No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL 1191738, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 
2013).   
174.  See Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557 (App. Div. 
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Gordon v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,175 the court expressly 
deviates from the tone set by Trulia.  The New York Appellate 
Court deliberately went for a different direction that favors the 
non-monetary disclosure settlement when the merits of the 
case warranted the disclosure settlement.  The review of 
settlement begins by examining “the likelihood of success, the 
extent of support from the parties, the judgment of counsel, the 
presence of bargaining in good faith, and the nature of the 
issues of law and fact.”176  The New York Court also set a 
different test for approving non-monetary settlement: whether 
such settlement would be in the best interest of the members of 
the putative class of shareholders and the corporation.177 
The court agreed with plaintiff’s decision to withdraw their 
claims for monetary damages “recognizing that they would be 
difficult to prove at trial.”178  The court’s interest in assessing 
the claims through adversarial process is conditioned upon the 
availability of helpful additional disclosures.  Here, the court 
would approve the existing disclosure agreement because they 
doubted the adversarial process would help plaintiff obtain 
“any more helpful disclosures.”179  In addition, the New York 
court understands that the best interest of the class is not 
necessarily served by requiring either the monetary settlement 
or the materiality of additional disclosure.  According to the 
Gordon court, the present proposed settlement, albeit 
nonmonetary, does provide benefits to the plaintiff class with 
its inclusion of a fairness opinion requirement in the event that 
Verizon engages in a transaction with a book value in excess of 
$14.4 billion, and corporate governance reforms.180  These 
benefits warranted not only the approval of the settlement, but 
also an award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff’s counsel.181  
 
2017). 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. at 566. 
177.  Id. at 568. 
178.  Id. at 567. 
179.  Id. (the court reasoned that “[i]t would be speculative, at best, to 
assume that plaintiff could have obtained any more helpful disclosures from 
Verizon by proceeding to trial.”). 
180.  Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 569 (App. Div. 
2017). 
181.  Id. (citing Seinfeld v. Robinson, 676 N.Y.S.2d 579 (App. Div. 1998)). 
35
JIANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/18  12:31 AM 
604 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38.2 
The court expressly disavowed the Delaware requirement that 
“additional information provided to shareholders in a 
disclosure must contradict what has been previously disclosed 
in order for the disclosure to be material is not supported by 
New York law, however.”182 
 
IV. Challenges to the Finality of Settlement:  Ex-Post Remedies 
to Overbroad Release 
 
As I have argued earlier, the materiality requirement does 
not ensure fairness and the doctrine of consideration dictates 
that supplemental disclosure need not be adequate to be a 
legally sufficient consideration.183  The combination of market 
competition and judicial assessment works better to serve the 
aim of achieving fairness in such class action settlements.  As 
to the overbroad release, the ex-ante scrutiny by the Court is 
crucial but will never be able to prevent release of all 
meritorious claims.  Still, there is an ex-post remedy provided 
by contract law if overall imbalance or gross disparity was 
resulted from the settlement.  Finality of settlement can be 
challenged, enforcement of a release of liability can be 
rescinded when it was induced by fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and as being unconscionable when such a 
release was overbroad compared to the benefit conveyed by 
supplemental disclosure. 
 
 A. Fraud 
 
A release can also be rescinded if it was induced by fraud. 
In Matsuura v. Alston & Bird, the Ninth Circuit held that 
releases signed in connection with settlement did not bar 
action alleging fraudulent inducement of those releases.184  The 
court announced that parties who have been fraudulently 
induced to enter into a contract have a choice of remedies: they 
may rescind the contract or they may affirm the contract and 
 
182.  Id. at 571. 
183.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
184.  See generally 166 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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sue for fraud.185  The court was of the opinion that “[e]nforcing 
such a settlement would undermine the policy of encouraging 
voluntary settlement of disputes: if litigants cannot assume the 
disclosures and representations of the opposing party are made 
in good faith, they will be reluctant to settle.”186 
Following the teaching of Matsuura, the settlement could 
be rescinded by the plaintiff class if there were any 
misrepresentations made to induce a disclosure settlement that 
secures broad release by giving out valueless additional 
disclosure. 
 
 B. Overbroad as Unconscionable 
 
Case law supports rescission based solely on overall 
imbalance.  In divorce settlements, an unfair settlement clause 
would be deemed unconscionable.  For example, in a New York 
case, a settlement clause escalating lifetime (even if she 
remarried) maintenance payments to the wife by four percent 
every year was deemed unconscionable and set aside.187  The 
court reasoned that it “represents a sum far in excess of the 
value of plaintiff’s marital distribution.”188  In cases like this, 
settlements can be set aside based simply on an unfair price. 
In analogy, when disclosure was given in exchange for an 
overbroad release compared to the benefits conveyed, when 
reasonableness between give and get is missing and gross 
disparity can be proved, the plaintiff class or the defendant 
corporation would be able to rescind the settlement as 
unconscionable. 
In addition, even when one argues that procedural 
unconscionability also has to be met before unconscionability 
can be applied due to the huge disparity in sophistication and 
resource between the stockholder class and the board of 
directors, procedural unconscionability would not be difficult to 
establish through the obvious unequal bargaining power 
between the two. 
 
185.  Id. at 1008. 
186.  Id. at 1012. 
187.  Santini v. Robinson, 891 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 2009). 
188.  Id. at 104. 
37
JIANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/18  12:31 AM 
606 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38.2 
V. Conclusion 
 
The standard in approving class-action settlements has 
always been fairness of the settlement.  Due to the agency 
problem and the conflicted interests between the plaintiff class 
and the plaintiff’s counsel in the context of disclosure-only 
settlements, the Delaware Court of Chancery established the 
heightened materiality standard in approving such 
settlements.  Supposedly, such a solution shall curb the conflict 
of interest and ensure fairness in disclosure-only settlements.  
It is also supposed to prevent corporations from receiving court-
approved overbroad releases through non-material disclosures. 
However, a settlement is a contract.  As I have established, 
contract law preserves fairness by enforcing the bargain as it 
is. The materiality requirement, on the other hand, will 
contradict the very notion that enforcement of pre-existing 
legal duty is no consideration.  Also, it will not serve the public 
policy of ensuring fairness in disclosure-only settlements.  It 
also creates the ethical dilemma that would encourage 
corporations to withhold material information. As I have 
proved, market mechanisms function to eventually weed out 
plaintiff firms that bring weak claims and have no interest in 
adequately representing a plaintiff class.  Chancellors have 
used their discretionary power to reject settlements and fee 
awards when it is clear that there was no adequate 
representation.  Judicial assessment of the Court in 
determining the fee award realigns the incentives and interest 
between the plaintiff class and the plaintiff’s counsel by 
quantifying attorney’s fees according to a meticulous three-
scale system. 
Moreover, finality of settlement can be challenged and 
overbroad release can still be rescinded by applying two 
contract law doctrines: fraudulent misrepresentation and 
unconscionability. 
Lastly, I predict the materiality standard will not sit well 
with the approval of disclosure-only settlements.  In enforcing 
a contract, all that a court ought to do is to enforce the bargain 
and make sure the bargaining process was in good faith and 
conducted fairly.  Market competition will ensure the fairness 
of the price, as the price would naturally be the fair market 
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price.  When market is not competitive, exploitation will take 
place.  When there is a lie, fraudulent inducement would be 
sufficient to rescind a contract.  When there is no lie, 
unconscionability works to restore the fairness.  Disclosure 
settlements can be valuable to the stockholder class and shall 
continue its function in shareholder litigation.  The future of 
approving disclosure-only settlements lies in the combination 
of judicial enforcement of the bargain and meticulous judicial 
assessment of attorney’s fees. 
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